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RUTLEDGE AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
W. HOWARD MANN*
"I believe in law. At the same time I believe in freedom. And I know
that each of these things may destroy the other. But I know too that, with-
out both, neither can endure . . . justice too is a part of life, of evolution, of
man's spiritual growth... Law, freedom, and justice-this trinity is the
object of my faith."'
The above quotation from the pen of Wiley Rutledge expresses the faith
of a great man, a great teacher, and a great judge. Rutledge possessed un-
bounded faith in democratic institutions, and abiding faith in his family, in
his friends, in his law schools, and in his students. This faith, attended by
a warmth and humaneness unique among men, created an interchange of
complete confidence between Rutledge and those with whom he associated.
Rutledge expended himself widely in the affairs of the communities in
which he lived. He was a close friend of all who knew him--community
leaders, lawyers, churchmen, grocers, garagemen, former students and col-
leagues, law clerks; a list would run into the hundreds. His letter writing
was as renowned as it was voluminous. Yet he remained without political
ambitions, a man of great courage with high standards of honesty and ethics
in all his relationships.
Intensely democratic, Rutledge stood for definite principles and actively
supported many controversial issues of the day, such as the child labor amend-
ment and the RooseveltCourt bill. The social and political views of Rutledge
were his own and were not tied to or controlled by any group. His was an
independent liberalism of the type of Senator Norris of Nebraska, with
whom he had a long and close friendship. He greatly admired Norris, as
well as Bryan, Wilson, and others. Of the Justices who had preceded him on
the Supreme Court, he was most influenced by Marshall, whose bold innova-
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1. RUTLEDGE, A DECLARATION or LEGAL FAITH 6, 9, 18 (1947). Rutledge states
further:
I believe therefore in justice. I believe in abstract justice, though I
cannot define it. But in any legal sense I believe in it only as the source
from which conceptions of concrete and legally relevant justice arise.
I believe in concrete justice, in particular justice, and in the possibility
of its growth and expansion. I believe in it as the end of legal institu-
tions and in them as the means by which it may be achieved. I believe
too in growth of the law and in this as the only means for making
reconciliation between the conflicting forces and conceptions, separately
considered, or order and freedom. Only thus may right accommodations
in social living and the maintenance of stable, social relationships be
fulfilled.
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tions had welded together a federal system with a strong central government
dmong many governments. 2 While he believed in the results reached by
Holmes and Brandeis, he followed neither the philosophy nor judicial re-
straint of Holmes, nor the judicial craftsmanship of Brandeis.
Rutledge carried his independent liberalism with him to the bench. But
this was not the guide to his conclusions. He studied each case extensively;
the record and briefs were underlined and marked, and tips of pages were
turned down for further use; the law clerk's memoranda received equally
meticulous treatment; all this was followed by a careful reading of the cases,
articles and books on the subject. By this time Rutledge was usually further
from a decision in his own mind than at the beginning. Before he could
formulate his conclusions, he had to begin writing, living the case. The parties,
the witnesses, the attorneys, the judges-all who had played a role-were
animated and brought on stage; the method was one of integrating the real
problems of real people with the social problems involved. Occasionally,
much of this procedure appeared in his opinions, making them seem labored,
repetitive, and unduly lengthy. But for him this was the process of judging.
His was not a legalistic, doctrinal approach, nor was he greatly influenced by
precedents and legal principles independent of the problems of the case. His
method was a fusion of the legal principles, findings, remedies, the whole of
the judicial process, with his understanding of the problems of each case
considered in the broad sphere of social policy.
Although Rutledge was a student of the commerce clause and a firm be-
liever in a strong federalism, his faith in "law, freedom, and justice" was
most noticeable in the cases involving civil liberties. The search of the in-
dividual for moral and spiritual, political and e--nomic self-realization
requires broad constitutional protections of speech, writings, and religious
activities, and freedom to engage in political affairs and discussion. In addi-
tion, the dignity of the individual demands similar safeguards in each step
of the criminal process. These shields Rutledge fought to give.
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Rutledge as a member of the United States Court of Appeals first judici-
ally expressed his concern over religious freedom in Busey v. District of
Columbia.3 The case presented a comparatively new application of the con-
2. Id. at 35.
3. 129 F.2d 24 (D. C. Cir. 1942), cert. granted, 319 U. S. 735 (1943), judgment
vacated per curtiam, 319 U. S. 579 (1943) (Rutledge dissenting). See Edgerton, Mr.
Justice Rutledge, 63 HARv. L. REv. 293, 295 (1949), where Judge Edgerton of the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, who wrote the majority opinion in Busey v.
District of Columbia, described the case as follows:
We had the question whether a small license tax on the privilege of
selling things in streets was constitutional in its application to nonprofit
sales of religious tracts. The majority thought it so clearly constitu-
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stitutional protections to religious liberty: whether a general licensing statute
which imposed a flat tax could be applied to the distribution of religious
literature in the public street. The Jehovah's Witnesses were engaged in
worldwide religious proselytism, distributing religious books, magazines and
pamphlets, in the streets and in house to house canvassing ;4 playing phono-
graph records in the streets, in public parks, and in private homes and apart-
ments;' and holding public parades and meetings and assemblies.' The
Witnesses were seeking small sums af money, but not profit; the amounts
received were to be used exclusively for religious matters.
The Busey case was clouded with problems of statutory construction and
whether the distribution constituted a sale. However, Rutledge in his dissent
looked through those questions to the basic issue-constitutional validity. For
him, such proselytizing constituted religious expression for these zealous
people.' In the absence of a showing of fraud or of some serious immorality
or injury to society, neither the courts, the legislature, the executive, nor
any governmental body has the capacity to say what constituted "re-
ligion" for any individual or group. Rutledge saw clearly that the privilege
of determining the form of one's religious expression was a vital part of his
freedom." The general public would have been shocked at the suggestion of
licensing and taxing orthodox religious services. If such would have been a
violation of the First Amendment, so was the license and tax on the evangel-
ism of the Jehovah's Witness sect. Rutledge's broad vision shines clearly in
the very beginning of these cases granting constitutional protection to those
who go forth in the name of religion; for him the answer was clear-the
distribution of religious literature could not validly be subjected to a license
or tax. The power of government was to be narrowed to the protection of
tional on precedent and principle that the opinion I wrote for the Court.
as I now think erroneously, hardly concerned itself with the social
interests involved. Rutledge was more functional. He thought the
tax infringed freedom of the press and religion, and he filed an eloquent
dissent.
4. Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U. S. 147 (1939) (McReynolds, J., dissenting)
(municipal ordinances prohibiting distribution of religious and other literature on public
streets held invalid; likewise ordinances requiring police permits to distribute on public
streets and canvass from house to house) ; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938)
(ordinance prohibiting as a nuisance distribution of literature within city without first
obtaining written permission of city manager held invalid on its face).
5. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940) (state statute forbidding solicita-
tion of money for religious use without a certificate from a state official, who had
discretion to grant or withhold approval, held previous restraint on the free exercise
of religion and invalid).
6. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569 (1941) (reasonable regulation of streets
for parades and processions to protect public use and convenience upheld; reasonable or
nominal license fees to cover administrative and police expenses also held valid).
7. Busey v. District of Columbia, 129 F.2d 24, 37 (D. C. Cir. 1942), (Rutledge. J.,
dissenting).
8. Ibid.
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streets and other public areas for the general use. Broader restrictions
could not be justified.
On June 8, 1942, the Supreme Court upheld convictions of Jehovah's
Witnesses for the distribution of religious literature without a license in three
cases from three states. Mr. Chief Justice Stone, in dissenting, was sub-
stantially in accord with the views expressed by Rutledge in the Busey case.
Stone looked upon the license fees as a tax on the privilege of disseminating
ideas ;"0 such regulations could be made a ready instrument for destruction of
the rights underlying the First Amendment." If a license tax were support-
able at all, it was only because a solicitation of funds was involved. But the
flat fees and the possibility of multiplying these in cities throughout the
country made abridgment of religious expression an inevitable consequence,
notwithstanding the solicitation of funds. 2
The cases affirming the restrictions on the proselytizing of the Jehovah's
Witnesses were short lived. On February 15, 1943, the day Rutledge took
his seat as Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, rehearing
was granted.'3 The resignation of Mr. Justice Byrnes and the appointment
of Rutledge provided the margin for reversal. 4 The Court split sharply in
these cases." The essence of the majority's position was that the form of
9. Jones v. Opelika, 316 U. S. 584 (1942) (Stone, C. J., Black, Douglas, and Murphy,
JJ., dissenting). The grounds of the majority opinion were essentially two: (1) the
fact that the Jehovah's Witnesses used the streets to disseminate their religion: The
privilege of expressing one's ideas "may be limited by action of the proper legislative
body to times, places and methods for the enlightenment of the community which, in view
of existing social and economic conditions, are not at odds with the preservation of peace
and good order . . . the proponents of ideas cannot determine entirely for themselves
the time and place and manner for the diffusion of knowledge or for their evangel-
ism. . . ." Id. at 594; (2) the commercial aspects of the Jehovah's Witnesses dissemina-
tion of religion: "When proponents of religious or social theories use the ordinary com-
mercial methods of sales of articles to raise propaganda funds, it is a natural and proper
exercise of the power of the State to charge reasonable fees for the privilege of can-
vassing." Id. at 597.
10. Id. at 602.
11. Id. at 607, 608.
12. Id. at 604, 609, 617.
13. Petition for rehearing granted in Jones v. Opelika, and in three other cases, 318
U. S. 796 (1943).
14. Jones v. Opelika, 316 U. S. 584 (1942), judgment vacated, 319 U. S. 103 (1943)
(Reed, Roberts, Frankfurter, and Jackson, JJ., dissenting).
15. In the flat license cases, Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943) (Reed,
Frankfurter, Roberts, and Jackson, JJ., dissenting), without disagreeing as to the high
place of religion under the First Amendment the dissenting Justices refused to accept such
broad areas of freedom for such wide scale proselytism. Two of the reasons given were
(1) that a city may charge those who use its facilities to help bear the cost, even when
those facilities are used for the dissemination of ideas; and (2) "oppression" of religion
of the Jehovah's Witnesses sect should not be assumed but proved by a factual showing.
The majority, at least by dictum, would have allowed a tax related to the services
rendered or a "nominal" fee for the service, but it was its collective judgment that the
effect of the flat tax was to constitute suppression, or at least potentially so, of the type
of religious evangelism engaged in by the Jehovah's Witnesses sect. The majority also
recognized the distinction between religious and commercial advertising through distri-
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evangelism used by various sects-preaching their Gospel in public places and
in thousands upon thousands of homes in an effort "through personal visita-
tions to win adherents to their faith"-holds "the same high estate under
the First Amendment as [does] worship in the churches and preaching from
the pulpits. It has the same claim to protection as the more orthodox and
conventional exercises of religion. It also has the same claim as the others
to the guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of the press."' 6
Mr. Justice Jackson in a dissenting opinion emphasized the abusiveness
of the literature criticising other religions and the great numbers who engaged
in the house to house canvassing, both of which tended to cause disruption.
He concluded that the cities should be permitted to regulate. 17  But for the
moment, the activity of the Jehovah's Witnesses was religion and entitled
to protection as such. Although the majority did not question the sincerity or
integrity of the practices of the sect, they recognized that not all conduct
could be made a "religious rite and by the zeal of the practitioners [be] swept
into the First Amendment."' 8
Rutledge's role in the Jehovah's Witnesses cases continued with his
opinion in Prince v. Massachusetts.'0  A state statute prohibited minors from
selling newspapers or magazines or from carrying on any trade in the streets.
A mother's offense was "permitting" her ward, a girl of nine years, to distri-
bute religious literature in the streets. The state court held this to be in
violation of the statute. Mr. Justice Rutledge, who favored extensive en-
largement of First Amendment freedoms to the resulting limitation on the
powers of the states, nevertheless determined the state's interest in the pro-
tection of the welfare of children to be greater in this instance than the
freedom of religious expression. 0 The state interest was also greater than
parental authority."- This judgment was by no means easy in view of the
bution of pamphlets. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, supra at 110, 111. Accord, Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 U. S. 52 (1942) ; Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 413, 418 (1943). In Martin
v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 (1943) (Frankfurter, Reed, Roberts and Jackson, JJ., dissent-
ing), a municipal ordinance prohibiting any person to knock on doors or otherwise summon
to the door the occupants for the purpose of distributing handbills was held invalid as
applied to the religious dissemination of the Jehovah's Witness sect. The Court's opinion
was narrowed to protect the resident owner from receiving those he warns to stay away.
In Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157 (1943) (Jackson, J., concurring), jurisdiction
of a United States District Court was upheld, without diversity or allegation of $3,000 in
controversy, to determine the constitutional validity of a municipal ordinance, requiring
license and tax, but not upheld to exercise the equity power of a federal court because
there was no showing of irreparable injury "both great and immediate." Douglas v.
Jeannette, supra at 164.
16. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, 109 (1943).
17. Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157, 166 (1943).
18. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, 109 (1943).
19. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158 (1944) (Jackson, Roberts and Frank-
furter, JJ., concurring on different grounds; Murphy, J., dissenting).
20. Id. at 165.
21. Id. at 166
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previous Jehovah's Witnesses cases.2" The rights of children to freedom
of expression of religious beliefs and of parents to give their children religious
training in schools had been recognized previously. 2  But considerable state
regulation f6r the welfare of children must also be recognized, even to the ex-
tent of taking precedence over religious expression and over a parent's right to
guide his child.2 4 The state's power over the child in such instances is greater
than that over the adult; the justifications are greater.2 1
A weakness which may be attributed to Rutledge's opinion is the failure
to give recognition to the "dear and present danger" principle in order to
determine the line where the protected area of religion ends and state power
begins. As Rutledge himself so clearly defined the application of the principle
in Thomas v. Collins,26 two determinable factors are required-a state interest
so paramount that if not recognized grave dangers to society would result;
and the occurrence of such dangers being imminent. Were these requisites
present in this case ?27 Perhaps to safeguard the community welfare from
certain harms is so patently paramount to the public interest there is no neces-
sity of assaying justification under the "clear and present danger" test. If
so, judicial determination then becomes a weighing of society's interest against
the necessity of preserving inviolate the First Amendment freedoms, a part
of democracy's underlying foundation. To maintain this foundation the
Court must require that infringing statutes have something more than a
"rational basis." This does not mean that snake charming or mail fraud
need ever be protected as religious rites.2 8 Yet, when the circumstances do
not concern the obvious, the Court faces an anomaly. It does not want to
determine what is for the community's welfare; neither can it determine
what constitutes "religion"-this must necessarily be left for the individual.
However, these are the factors which must be measured and assayed to define
the sacred areas of religious freedom and the restraints on the processes of
22. Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157 (1943) ; Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141
(1943) ; Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943) ; Jones v. Opelika, 319 U. S.
103 (1943).
23. Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943) (state could not make the
flag salute ceremonies in public school compulsory when it interfered with religious beliefs
of Jehovah's Witnesses) ; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925) (state could
not require all children to attend secular public school) ; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S.
390 (1923) (state could not prohibit all languages but English taught in primaries).
24. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 166 (1944).
25. Id. at 167, 168.
26. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 530 (1945).
27. "If the right of a child to practice its religion in that manner is to be forbidden by
constitutional means, there must be convincing proof that such a practice constitutes a
grave and immediate danger to the state or to the health, morals or welfare of the
child. . . . The state, in my opinion, has completely failed to sustain its burden of prov-
ing the existence of any grave or immediate danger to any interest which it may lawfully
protect." Prince v. Massachusetts, 323 U. S. 171, 174 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 166.
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government 9.2  Cases and precedents, doctrines and principles, and even
history-these are of little real help. Each case brings new circumstances,
and out of these the Court must add to the structure of democracy. Wisdom
and understanding, philosophy and statesmanship, such as Rutledge demon-
strated in the Jehovah's Witnesses cases, will serve to produce lasting
impressions.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Rutledge's contribution to free speech and assembly is highlighted by a
competent and noteworthy opinion in Thomas v. Collins.3" Involved was the
validity of a particular application of a Texas statute requiring union organ-
izers to register before soliciting membership within the state.3 1 R. J. Thomas,
president of the United Auto Workers, had scheduled an address before an
assembly of Hovston oil refinery employees. A restraining order, issued ex
parte only a few hours before the address, enjoined Thomas from solicita-
tion, unless he registered with the Secretary of State. This was understood
to forbid also the speech and assembly. During the speech in support of the
labor movement, Thomas invited one nonunion man to join the Oil Workers
Industrial Union. The judgment of the state court, holding Thomas in con-
tempt, considered the whole speech and assembly to be "solicitation"; hence,
it could not be upheld as based on the single invitation. 2
Rutledge, after a careful analysis of the record, significantly showed that
Thomas was in Texas for one purpose only-to make a public address which
had been widely advertised. Specifically decided was whether the registration
statute could be validly applied to one speaking at a peaceful assembly on
the benefits of the union movement. By so restricting the issue and holding
only the particular application invalid. Rutledge was able to preserve the
29. See Antieau, The Ride of Clear and Present Danger: Scope of Its Applicability,
48 MicH. L. REV. 811 (1950).
30. 323 U. S. 516 (1945) (majority: Rutledge, Black, Douglas, and Murphy, JJ.,
with Jackson, J., concurring; dissenting: Roberts, J., with Stone, C. J., Reed, and
Frankfurter, JJ.).
See notes, 25 B. U. L. REV. 151 (1945) ; 33 CALIF. L. REV. 465 (1945) ; 45 COL. L.
REv. 465 (1945) ; 14 FORDHAm L. REV. 59 (1945) ; 33 GFo. L. 3. 227 (1945) ; 21 IND. L. J.
61 (1945); 43 Mirc. L. REV. 1159 (1945); 30 MINN. L. REV. 204 (1946); 20 NOTRE
DAMiE LAW. 336 (1945) ; 19 TENN. L. REV. 494 (1946) ; 31 VA. L. REv. 691 (1945).
31. The statute's purpose was to require paid union organizers to file with the state
secretary of state and secure an organizer's card stating his name and his labor union
affiliations. The state courts were given power to issue restraining orders, injunctions
and any other writs or processes appropriate to enforce the provisions of the Act. Ad-
ditional enforcement proceedings included civil penalties not exceeding $1,000 against the
union for violations, and misdemeanor penalties against the union or organizer not to
exceed $500 and/or confinement not to exceed 60 days. A labor organizer was anyone
receiving remuneration for solicitation of union memberships. 323 U. S. 516, 519 n.1
(1945) ; Ex parte Thomas, 141 Tex. 591, 174 S. W.2d 958 (1943).
32. 323 U. S. 516, 529 (1945).
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state statute and at the same time to uphold, indeed enlarge, the protections
of free speech and free assembly. 8
Rutledge then turned to the determination of a standard.3 4 Registration
requirements for solicitation had previously been held invalid where there was
discretion in public officials to deny the application; but there had been impli-
cations that nondiscretionary registration might be compatible with the First
Amendment prohibitions.38 However, the requirement of registration of the
speaker in conjunction with enforcement machinery necessary to make the
statute effective would constitute substantial regulation of speech and as-
sembly. Thus, the Court drew "the line" so as not to say that registration for
identification of the speaker could never be required; but certainly it could
not be done without a showing of grave and immediate danger to the state.
This, of course, called for an application of "clear and present danger";
restrictions of the democratic freedoms of the First Amendment demand for
justification "the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests" and "clear
support of public danger, actual or impending."36
Determination of such a line of demarcation places a duty on the Court
"to say where the individual's freedom ends and the State's power begins."3
The approach is inherently subjective since it requires balancing the degree of
injury to the state with that to the individual. 38 Upon which side of the line
each case will fall depends much upon the complexion of the Court. Likewise,
much depends upon the social and political conditions of the time. Thus Rut-
ledge employed what may be called a psychological approach, but an influen-
tial one, viz: the "clear and present danger" principle places a heavy burden
on the government to justify infringement of the freedoms that hold a pre-
ferred place in the minds of most judges. 39 This is the guide for the Court in
applying the limitations of the First Amendment freedoms.
THREE SIGNIFICANT DISSENTS
Three outstanding opinions of Mr. Justice Rutledge are dissents: the
New Jersey school bus case, Everson v. Board of Education;0 the case of the
33. Id. at 541, 542. See A. F. of L. v. Mann, 188 S. W.2d 276, 279 (Tex. 1945)
(statute continued in force).
34. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 529 (1945).
35. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 305 (1940) ; Manchester v. Leiby, 117
F.2d 661, 664 (1st Cir. 1941).
36. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 530 (1945).
37. Id. at 529.
38. Antieau, supra note 29, at 840.
39. See the debate between Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Rutledge in
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77, 89, 106 (1949), over giving the First Amendment
freedoms a preferred position.
40. 330 U. S. 1, 28-74 (1947).
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Japanese general convicted of war crimes, In re Yamashita;4' and the John L.
Lewis contempt case, United States v. United Mine Workers.42
The First Amendment says "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." The pro-
hibition clause has been incorporated in the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, in effect making it applicable to the states. The result
has been increased protection and freedom for those engaged in the dissemina-
tion of religion. State and local authorities are now required to perform their
public duties so as to neither discriminate against nor censor the activities of
religious minorities. 4
3
The Everson case turned the Court to the establishment clause which had
been left substantially dormant throughout the history of constitutional litiga-
tion.44 An established church has not been known in this country since
Massachusetts disestablished the Congregational Church in 1833. 4 1 However,
numerous instances of public support for religion-in the form of tax and
other statutory exemptions-have continued in this country; many of them
are so well accepted and so much a part of American life that they no longer
cause dissension nor substantially favor one religion over another.4 6
The controversy in the Everson case concerned state support of religious
schools. A township board of education in New Jersey appropriated school
funds for the transportation of children to the public schools and to the
Catholic parochial schools within the township. McCollum v. Board of Edu-
cation," in the 1947 October Term, concerned the union of sectarian education
with secular education in the public schools and brought into question the
constitutional validity of "release time"-the release of children from secular
instruction provided they attend sectarian instruction.4 8
41. 327 U. S. 1, 41-81 (1946).
42. 330 U. S. 258, 342-385 (1947).
43. See p. 533 et seq. supra.
44. In Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U. S. 291 (1899), a taxpayer sought to enjoin an
expenditure of tax funds by the District of Columbia to construct an isolation ward on
the property of a hospital operated under the auspices of the Roman Catholic Church.
Mr. Justice Peckham barely referred to the establishment clause of the First Amendment.
The Court looked upon the hospital as "simply the case of a secular corporation being
managed by people who hold to the doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church." In Elliott
v. White, 23 F.2d 997 (D. C. Cir. 1928), the taxpayer who sought to enjoin the payment
of salaries to chaplains of the Senate, House of Representatives, Army, and Navy was
held to have no standing to sue. Cochran v. Board of Education, 281 U.-S. 370 (1930),
involved the appropriation of state funds for free textbooks to all school children. The
attack was against the purchase of school books in non-public schools and use of public
funds for private purposes in violation of due process. No question was raised as to a
violation of the establishment clause.
45. See Sutherland, Due Process and Disestablishment, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1306,
1309 (1949).
46. See Paulsen, Preferment of Religious Institutions in Tax and Labor Legislation,
14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 144 (1949).
47. 333 U. S. 203 (1948).
48. Id. at 207
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The evolution of education from the sectarian of the colonial period to
the completely nonsectarian public school of the present day is a social
phenomenon of an ever-changing democratic society. This has not been "a
sudden achievement nor attained without violent conflict. ' 49 The withdrawal
of tax funds from the church school and the resulting increased support of
public schools have occurred with growing momentum during each passing
decade.50 The elimination of sectarian teaching from public schools presents
a similar story. These developments came in the face of fierce sectarian
opposition.5 1 However, they were inevitable in the growth of a democracy
striving both for unity and for freedom of the individual. The preservation of
public education from the irreconcilable pressures of sectarianism made strict
confinement of public schools to secular education a necessary requisite of a
free society. Public education has become a unifying force, not a dividing one.
The concomitant is to preserve for the individual freedom to work out his
own religious beliefs and to save his conscience from censorship or control.
To preserve this freedom, the expression of religious beliefs must be with-
drawn from the vicissitudes of political and religious controversy.5 2
The development of completely secular instruction in the public school
does not portend a society disinterested in religion nor a decline in the sig-
nificance of religious beliefs and their expression. These are left to the in-
dividual, his home and his church. Nevertheless, the deletion of sectarian
instruction in the school combined with a decline in religious training in the
home has caused many sincere people grave concern. Not every sect is able
to maintain its own parochial school where sectarian instruction can be inter-
mixed with the secular, without the resulting strife and destruction of free-
dom.52 The attempt to alleviate the consequences of such a wholesale with-
drawal of sectarian instruction has taken many forms. The Everson and
McCollum cases present examples-financial aid from tax funds for parochial
schools, and the "release time" union of sectarian with secular education in
the public schools. The question raised was whether such measures con-
stituted a "union" of church and state in violation of the establishment clause
of the First Amendment.
Mr. Justice Black in writing for the majority in the Everson case held the
payment of the bus fares not a contribution to religion nor to religious educa-
49. Frankfurter, J., in McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 217 (1948)
(Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion in the McCollum case is masterful).
50. Id. at 214-217.
51. Ibid.
52. Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 638 (1943).
53. Parochial school education is constitutionally protected. Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925) ; see Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 27, 46,
51 (1947) ("separation of church and state" prohibits state aid as well as state inter-
ference).
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tion.54 The State of New Jersey merely provided funds for a general program
to assist the parents, regardless of their religious beliefs, to secure the trans-
portation of their children safely and expeditiously to and from accredited
schools whether public or parochial."' Transportation services were analogized
to police and fire protection for the safety of the children."
Mr. Justice Rutledge, in dissenting, wrote an opinion that will continue to
influence the building of the structure for a democratic society. For him the
use of state tax funds for transportation was "opening the door" to a union
of church and state. It was as much a contribution by the state for religious
education as a payment of the children's tuition.17 This was not "a little case
over bus fares.""8  "Public money devoted to payment of religious costs,
educational or other, brings the quest for more. It brings too the struggle of
sect against sect for the larger share or for any.""9  "The end of such strife
cannot be other than to destroy the cherished liberty. The dominating group
will achieve the dominant benefit; or all will embroil the state in their dis-
sensions. "'"0 Such a use of public funds means that each taxpayer contributes
to "the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves."' , "That consequence
and effect are not removed by multiplying to all-inclusiveness the sects for
which support is exacted. The Constitution requires, not comprehensive iden-
tification of state with religion, but complete separation."6 2
The most significant portion of the Rutledge opinion however is his use
of history to presently interpret the establishment clause. Thomas Jefferson's
statement that the purpose of the First Amendment was to build "a wall of
separation between church and state" was illuminated to mean complete
separation."5  Rutledge's principal authority, however, was James Madison's
54. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 16-18 (1947).
55. Id. at 18.
56. See Jackson, J., dissenting, for a different interpretation of the record and state
statute. Id. at 18-28.
57. Id. at 48.
58. Rutledge, J., id. at 57.
59. Id. at 53.
60. Id. at 54.
61. Id. at 45, 60.
62. Id. at 60.
63. This statement was made by President Jefferson in a letter to a Baptist Associa-
tion at Danbury, Connecticut, sent on January 1, 1802. The first sentence of the second
paragraph of the letter read as follows:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between
man and his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his
worship, that the legislative powers of government reach actions only,
and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence the act of the
whole American people which declared that their legislature should make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof, thus building a wall of separation between church and
State. (Italics supplied.)
Quoted in Sutherland, Due Process and Disestablishment, 62 HARV. L. Rzv. 1306, 1310
(1949) ; O'NEILL, RELIGION AND EDUCATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 286 (1949).
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historic Miemorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, written
in 1785 to oppose a bill pending in the Virginia Assembly which would levy a
tax to support "'teachers of the Christian religion."'6 4 It was supported by
Patrick Henry and other prominent men of the time.6' The opponents of the
bill were led by Jefferson and Mkadison. 66 In addition to the writing of the
Remonstrance, which played a large role in the defeat of the bill of 1785,
Madison was a co-author of the religious clause of the Virginia Declaration of
Rights of 1776 ;67 he is credited with being the first to propose that religious
freedom be made a protected, inherent right rather than a mere principle of
tolerance :6 and as a member of the First Congress he introduced the first
draft of the Bill of Rights."'
The interpretation of the Constitution through history is necessarily a
highl subjective process. However, the Court must look to many sources
before giving life and meaning to its broad clauses. By analyzing the back-
ground of the First Amendment, particularly the views of Jefferson and
Madison, and the history of religious and public schools, Rutledge interpreted
the Amendment to mean that the legislature was prohibited from making any
contributions from public funds to any or to all religions.7 This competent
utilization of significant sources provides the strength of Rutledge's dissent.71
The Rutledge dissent in Everson v. Board of Education carried the day in
the McCollum case. The Court held that the use of the state's compulsory
educational program to require attendance at either religious or secular classes
constituted an amalgamation of the tax-supported school with religious edu-
cation **to aid religious groups to spread their faith. ' -7 2  This, it was said,
64. Madison's document is set out in full as an Appendix to Rutledge's opinion,
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 63 (1946), as is Patrick Henry's bill to levy
a tax for the teachers of the Christian religion, 330 U. S. 72 (1946).
65. Rutledge, .1, dissenting, id. at 38; Corwin, The Supreme Court as a National
Board, 14 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 3, 12 (1949).
66. Rutledge, id. at 35.
67. Id. at 34.
68. Ibid.
69. Id. at 39. Madison's draft provided: "The civil rights of none shall be abridged
on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established,
nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or in any pretext,
infringed." 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 434 (1789).
70. Professor Corwin in his recent article on the Everson and 31cCollun cases says
that Mr. Justice Rutledge's reliance on Madison's Menwrial and Remonstrance to pro-
hibit a state contribution to all religions is excessive. Corwin, The Supreme Court as a
National Board, 14 LAW & CONTEMaP. PROB. 3, 13 (1949). He reads Madison's conception
of "establishment of religion" to prevent one religion from enjoying a preferred status
which would carry with it the right to compel others to conform. Ibid. Rutledge's
answer in his dissenting opinion is that any contribution to all as well as to one religion
would eventually lead to the preference of the dominant religion or religions with the
inevitable required conformance.
71. Mr. Justice Frankfurter adds greatly to these sources in his opinion in the
McCollun case, 333 U. S. at 203, 212 (1948).
72. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 210 (1948).
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"falls squarely under the ban of the First Amendment. ' 73 "The great Ameri-
can principle of eternal separation between Church and the State" was
violated.
7 4
One of the great essays in the literature of the Supreme Court is Mr.
Justice Rutledge's dissent in the Yantashita case. 5 Tomoyuki Yamashita was
the commanding general of the Japanese Fourteenth Army group in the
Philippine Islands. The Emperor broadcast his "imperial rescript," ordering
his troops to accept the American demands of "unconditional surrender" on
August 14, 1945, but Yamashita waited until September 2, 1945, the day of
the formal surrender, to pass through his defense lines, descend from the hills,
and present his sword to the American forces."6 General Yamashita remained
a prisoner of war from the date of his surrender until his execution on Feb-
ruary 23, 1946. Less than one month after surrender, he was served with a
charge of violating the laws of war. The charge read simply:
Tomoyuki Yamashita, General Imperial Japanese Army, between
9 October 1944 and 2 September 1945, at Manila and at other places
in the Philippine Islands, while commander of armed forces of Japan
at war with the United States of America and its allies, unlawfully
disregarded and failed to discharge his duty as commander to control
the operations of the members of his command, permitting them to
commit brutal atrocities and other high. crimes against the people of
the United States and of its allies and dependencies, particularly the
Philippines, and he, General Tomoyuki Yamashita, thereby violated
the laws of war.7 7
On October 1, 1945, the members of the military commission and Yamashita's
defense staff were appointed by the commander of the United States Army
Forces in Manila. The arraignment took place on the eighth day of October,
1945, before the military commission of five American officers; the accused
pleaded not guilty. A bill of particulars setting forth sixty-four specifications
was filed at that time, describing in detail the crimes alleged to have been
committed by the Japanese troops. The motion of the defense that the charge
be made more specific was denied by the commission, but one for a continuance
was granted. Trial began on October 29, 1945.
At the beginning of the trial the prosecution filed a supplemental bill of
particulars containing fifty-nine items. The specifications in the two bills
charged murder, massacre, rape, and pillage of innocent noncombatant civilians
both in Manila and in the provinces; mistreatment, starvation, and murder of
American prisoners of war and civilian internees; wanton devastation and
73. Ibid.
74. Statement of Elihu Root, quoted in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion in the
McCollum case. Id. at 219, 231.
75. It re Yamashita, 327 U. S. 1 (1946).
76. REEL, TnE CASE OF GENERAL YAMASHXITA 12 (1949).
77. Id. at 32.
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destruction of public, private, and religious property."8 The defense was
denied a continuance to study the additional specifications in the supplemental
bill. The prosecution's case lasted until November 20, 1945-six days a week
with night sessions-at which time the defense was granted the remainder of
one day to prepare its opening statements.
7 9
The evidence offered by the prosecution consisted of witnesses and docu-
ments testifying to atrocities committed by Japanese troops during the seige
of the Philippine Islands. Some of it was introduced through testimony of
witnesses who had been tortured or raped but much was in the form of affi-
davits secured by Army investigators who worked for months securing the
necessary data. Some specific examples of the evidence will show the
terribleness of it as well as the difficulties faced by the defense.
A Filipino resident of Batanes Island, where three captured American
fliers had been executed, testified that a Japanese captain had told him that
the admiral in command of the Island had, in turn, informed the captain that
he, the admiral, had received a telegram from General Yamashita ordering all
prisoners of war to be killed. The commission admitted the testimony over
the objection that it was hearsay and also cut short cross examination as to
the details, of the alleged conversation between the witness and the Japanese
captain."'
The Manila atrocities were studded with rape and sex orgies. Yamashita's
defense to the charge of responsibility was that he had ordered the Japanese
Army to abandon Manila; that by the time the atrocities occurred all but 1,600
army troops had been evacuated. Twenty thousand naval troops placed under
his command on January 8, 1945, had also been ordered to leave but had
remained under a conflicting order from the naval command to destroy the
harbor, docks, and naval headquarters. The crimes in Manila were committed
in February in the face of approaching superior numbers of American forces."'
Mass executions of families and groups committed in the outlying
provinces were directed and supervised by Japanese officers in command of
local garrisons and were ostensibly for the purpose of wiping out Philippine
guerrillas who had become quite active upon the arrival of American forces.
General Yamashita had issued an order for the destruction of armed guer-
rillas. A Japanese colonel testified he gave the orders for the mass execu-
tions but there was no evidence in the record that Yamashita had ordered
atrocities. The prosecution's case was based on the proposition that the out-
rageous atrocities under Yamashita's command were so extensive that he either
knew or should have known of them and therefore was to be held responsible.8 2
78. Id. at 91.
79. Id. at 80.
80. Id. at 99.
81. Id. at 102.
82. Id. at 107.
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In addition there were charges of starvation and mistreatment of civilian
internees and prisoners of war, and of executing prisoners of war as in the
infamous Palawan incident. In December, 1944, one hundred fifty-one
Americans were being used by the Japanese as ,onstruction laborers on an air-
field on Palawan Island. After a number of American planes had been seen
overhead, the prisoners were ordered into air raid shelters. Gasoline was
poured into the shelters and ignited. Some of the trapped men were burned
to death. Those who dashed into the open ran into a hail of machine gun
bullets. Only nine men escaped by swimming to another island. The Japanese
committing this outrage were of the air force and were not a part of
Yamashita's command. 3
The trial of General Yamashita ended on December 5, 1945. The verdict
was guilty as charged; the sentence, death by hanging, was handed down on
December 7, 1945.4
On application for habeas corpus,8 the Supreme Court found there was
authority to create the commission; the charge with the supplemental bills
was adequate to make out war crimes; the reception in evidence of depositions
and hearsay and opinion evidence did not violate the articles of war: and the
failure to give notice to the protecting power was not contrary to the articles
of the Geneva Convention. The proceedings were therefore lawful and there
was no necessity of being concerned with matters going to the substance of
due process. The details of the trial were for the reviewing authorities and
not for the courts, and it was unnecessary to consider what due process might
revtuire in other situations, the intimation being that due process was not
available to Yamashita.88
83. Id. at 112-117.
84. The commission heard 86 witnesses who gave over 3,000 pages of testimony.
The record itself ran to more than 4,000 pages and 483 exhibits. Id. at 168-175.
85. The defense counsel early in the trial petitioned the Philippine Supreme Court
for habeas corpus on these grounds: (1) that since the civil courts were open and the
area was under civil authority there was no constitutional power in the military commis-
sion; (2) that no notice had been given to Japan's protective power, Switzerland, as re-
quired by the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929; and (3) that the use of unauthorized
evidence, violating two congressional statutes and the basic guaranties of due process,
invalidated the proceedings. Id. at 185-196. Petition for habeas corpus was denied by
the Philippine Supreme Court on November 27, 1945. The defense counsel filed an
original petition in the Supreme Court for habeas corpus dispatched by air from the
Philippines on November 26. After the decision of the Philippines Court, defense counsel
also filed a petition for certiorari. Both petitions were considered together. On Decem-
ber 20, 1945, the Court entered an order setting January 7, 1946, for oral argument. The
Secretary of War sent General MacArthur a directive to stay the military proceedings.
Id. at 197-201, 202-205.
86. lit re Yamashita, 327 U. S. 1, 23 (1946):
• . . we hold that the commission's rulings on evidence and on the
mode of conducting these proceedings against petitioner are not
reviewable by the courts, but only by the reviewing authorities. From
this viewpoint it is unnecessary to consider what, in other situations, the
Fifth Amendment might require, and as to that no intimation one way or
the other is to be implied.
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Mr. Justice Murphy's dissent was based on the inadequacy of the charge;
there was a complete failure to connect the defendant Yamashita with personal
guilt or responsibility for crimes committed by the Japanese troops. "Instead
the loose charge was made that great numbers of atrocities had been committed
and that petitioner was the commanding officer; hence he must be guilty of
disregard of duty. Under that charge the commission was free to establish
whatever standard of duty on petitioner's part that it desired. '8 7
However, the essence of the charge was that the atrocities were the result
of the failure of General Yamashita to control the officers and troops under his
command. The findings of the commission relied on the great number and con-
tinuousness of such outrages and their supervision by Japanese soldiers of all
ranks. Unless the Yamashita conviction was to reflect merely the state of Japa-
nese culture, it had to be based on the violation of a general standard of duty
and responsibility for military commanders." Had the military commission and
the judge advocate comprehended this legal justification for the charge, they
would not have included in the record offenses committed by officers and
troops under other Japanese military commanders. If Yamashita's conviction
could be taken to indicate the recognition of an affirmative responsibility in
military commands to prevent barbarism in modern warfare, his life might not
have been taken in vain. 9 It is a saddening realization that the case failed
even to point toward this goal.
Rutledge's dissent shows the extent to which the trial of Yamashita fell
below the standards of Anglo-American legal traditions. For him, it was "the
basic standards of trial which, among other guaranties, the nation fought to
keep ;" it was the responsibility of the Court to see that military justice shall
not "be above or beyond the fundamental law or the control of Congress."90
He expressed his reluctance to dissent in a case with such national and
international implications:
Not with ease does one find his views at odds with the Court's in
a matter of this character and gravity. Only the most deeply felt
convictions could force one to differ. That reason alone leads me to
do so now, against strong considerations for withholding dissent.
More is at stake than General Yamashita's fate. . . . It is not too
early, it is never too early, for the nation steadfastly to follow its great
constitutional traditions, none older or more universally protective
against unbridled power than due process of law in the trial and
punishment of men, that is, of all men, whether citizens, aliens,
alien enemies or enemy belligerents. It can become too late.91
87. Id. at 40.
88. Fairman, The Supreme Court on Military Jurisdiction, 59 HAM. L. REv. 833, 869
(1946).
89. Cf. Murphy, J., dissenting 327 U. S. 1, 35 (1946) ; Fairman, supra note 88, at 869.
90. In re Yamashita, 327 U. S. 1, 42 (1946).
91. Id. at 41.
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Rutledge was in complete disagreement with the majority on all counts
except as to authority in the Army to try Yamashita for violations of the laws
of war. General MacArthur's directive that the commission "shall admit such
evidence as in its opinion would be of assistance in proving or disproving the
charge, or such as in the commission's opinion would have probative value in
the mind of a reasonable man,"92 was in the opinion of Rutledge a violation
of at least two articles of war. 3  Since its very creation was in violation of
congressional statutes, the commission appointed never acquired valid juris-
diction to try Yamashita. 94  Rutledge also thought the arbitrary denial to
defense counsel of adequate time to prepare its case constituted such a "wide
departure from the most elementary principles of fairness" that it "vitiated
the proceeding."9  But he saved his stronger feelings to dissent from the
implication that the requirement of a fair trial under due process had no ap-
plication-to Yamashita. "Not heretofore," said Rutledge, "has it been held
that any human being is beyond its universally protecting spread in the
guaranty of a fair trial in the most fundamental sense."96 The language used
by Rutledge in the following passage vividly expresses his tenacious ob-
servance of the constitutional traditions of his country.
I cannot believe in the face of this record that the petitioner
has had the fair trial our Constitution and laws command. Because
I cannot reconcile what has occurred with their measure, I am forced
to speak. At the bottom my concern is that we shall not forsake in
any case, whether Yamashita's or another's, the basic standards of
trial which, among other guaranties, the nation fought to keep; that
our system of military justice shall not alone among all our forms of
judging be above or beyond the fundamental law or the control of
Congress within its orbit of authority; and that this Court shall not
fail in its part under the Constitution to see that these things do
not happen ... 17
I cannot accept the view that anywhere in our system resides orlurks a power so unrestrained to deal with any human being through
92. Id. at 48 n.9.
93. Id. at 61. Article 25 provides in part as follows: "A duly authenticated deposi-
tion taken upon reasonable notice to the opposite party may be read in evidence before
any military court or commission in any case not capital. . . ." 41 STAT. 792 (1920), 10
U. S. C. § 1496 (1927). The majority held Article 25 not applicable to the trial of an
enemy combatant by a military commission for violations of the law of war. In re
Yamashita, 327 U. S. 1, 19 (1946). The same was held for Article 38, which provides in
part as follows: "The President may, by regulations, which he may modify from time
to time, prescribe the procedure, including modes of proof, in cases before courts-
martial . . . military commissions, and other military tribunals, which regulations shall
insofar as he shall deem practicable, apply the rules of evidence generally recognized in
the trial of criminal cases in the district courts of the United States ... " 41 STAT.
794 (1920), 10 U. S. C. § 1509 (1927).
94. 11 re Yamashita, 327 U. S. 1, 56, 61 (1946).
95. Id. at 61.
96. Id. at 79.
97. Id. at 42
MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE-A SYMPOSIUM
any process of trial. . . . Nor has any human being heretofore been
held to be wholly beyond elementary procedural protection by the
Fifth Amendment. I cannot consent to even implied departure from
that great absolute."8
Perhaps Rutledge was fighting for the impossible in his Yamashita dis-
sent.09 His fight was for the nation to rise to his ideals of democracy in its
treatment of a defeated enemy. He fought the same fight for minority groups,
for persons accused of crime-for all, without consideration of race, creed,
or color. "The gap between his understanding and the nation's performance
is the measure of stature to which he rose and of the distance we must travel
if humanity is indeed to achieve its destiny."'0 0
The John L. Lewis contempt case, United States v. United Mine
Workers,'0 ' "became a cause c~lkbre the moment it began."'0 2 The case arose
when a coal shutdown bad the productive facilities of the country almost
completely paralyzed. The Government had seized the mines under the War
Labor Disputes Act.0 s The district court had entered a temporary restraining
order against the Union and Lewis prohibiting them from carrying into effect
a strike notice. Violations of the order caused the parties to be held in con-
tempt.104 The Court upheld the contempt decree over the defendant's con-
tentions that the Norris-LaGuardia Act withdrew jurisdiction from federal
courts to issue temporary restraining orders in labor disputes, including cases
to which the Government was a party.0 5 The combining of civil and criminal
contempt was also upheld by the Court.
Rutledge's dissent accords with ir. Justice Frankfurter's opinion that
the Norris-LaGuardia Act withdrew the power of the federal courts to issue
injunctions in labor disputes even under Government seizure.' If the district
court lacked this power it could not issue a temporary order to preserve
the status quo while determining jurisdiction. For in labor disputes the
effect of such orders "is generally not merely failure to maintain the status
quo pending final decision on the merits. It is also most often to break
the strike, without regard to its legality or any conclusive determination
on that account, and thus to render moot and abortive the substantive con-
troversy."10 7 The underlying policy of the Act prohibiting restraining orders
in labor disputes applies as much to one issued to determine jurisdiction as to
98. Id. at 81.
99. For him, "the Constitution follows the flag." Id. at 47.
100. Fuchs, Wiley B. Rutledge, 7 NAT'- B. J. 393, 397 (1949).
101. 330 U. S. 258 (1947).
102. Id. at 342.
103. Id. at 322.
104. Id. at 266, 267.
105. Id. at 307.
106. Id. at 307, 312-328, 343-351.
107. H. at 353.
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any other. Certainly the power of the district court to issue a temporary order
to preserve the status quo is subject to congressional control. Since Congress
had excluded such jurisdiction in all cases involving labor disputes, no federal
court had power to punish for contempt "the violation of such an order issued
in contravention of -Congress' command.'1 8
Rutledge expressed his opposition intensely to the proposition drawn out
of United States v. Shipp,' by the majority and Mr. Justice Frankfurter, that
contempt proceedings are nonetheless valid when based on an order later de-
termined to have been issued without power in the issuing court."' He con-
sidered that the development of such a principle nullified the historic protec-
tions in habeas corpus jurisdiction."' And the First Amendment liberties
especially would be vulnerable to such inherent power in the courts."'
A principal part of Rutledge's dissent protested the admixture of criminal
and civil contempt in the same proceedings." 3 "In some respects matters of
procedure constitute the very essence of ordered liberty under the Constitu-
tion."' 1 4  The sharp differentiation in the protections surrounding the two
proceedings prohibit their being "hashed together in a single criminal-civil
hodgepodge.""'  The procedural safeguards of the Bill of Rights which are
not inconsistent with criminal contempt-the privilege against self-indrimina-
tion, presumption of innocence, right to counsel, proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, and others-are applicable thereto." 6 These would not be preserved if
trial and punishment for criminal contempt were an interchanging part of pro-
ceedings for civil contempt. "One who doe's not know until the end of litigation
what his procedural rights in trial are, or may have been, has no such rights.""17
Rutledge recognized that "beyond this controversy as a whole [lay] still
graver questions.""' They involved the opposing claims concerning the right
to strike and the power of the Government to keep the nation's economy going.
Rutledge observed that tinder "a government of laws and not of men," as we
possess, power must be exercised according to law and not. according to the
dictates of one or a group; but "government, including the courts, as well as
108. Id. at 363.
109. 203 U. S. 563 (1906).
110. A limitation exists where no substantial inquiry can be made into the existence
of a power "that has unquestionably been withheld." United States v. United Mine
Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 310 (1947).
111. Id. at 354.
112. Id. at 352.
113. Id. at 363-376.
114. Id. at 363.
115. Id. at 364.
116. Id. at 371-375. Rutledge, J., dissenting: ". . . all of the constitutional
guaranties applicable to trials for crime should apply to such trials for contempt, excepting
only those which may be wholly inconsistent with the nature and execution of the function
the Court must perform." Id. at 374.
117. Ibid.
118. Id. at 385.
MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE-A SYMPOSIUM
the governed, must move within its limitations." 1  9 While the crisis was grave
Congress had neither acted, nor authorized the courts to act, in Rutledge's
judgment. History will uphold Rutledge, a pillar of strength whom a grave
political crisis did not bend.
FAIR TRIAL PROTECTIONS
The right of an accused to a fair trial was ever on Rutledge's judicial
conscience. 20 For him the trial and punishment of men placed the gravest
responsibility on the judiciary to preserve enlightened standards of procedural
fairness in each stage of the criminal process. Rutledge's concern in this
matter was evident in his work on the Court of Appeals. In Boykin v. Huff 2 '
he was most solicitous of an indigent defendant's right of appeal, holding that
an informal letter by the accused was sufficient to perfect his appeal ;22 and
in Wood v. United States'2 3 he held the admission in evidence of a plea of
guilty taken at a preliminary hearing before a committing magistrate to be in
violation of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. 2 4
During the past ten-year history of the Supreme Court, review of the
states' criminal process cases has taken on a "new significance" in constitu-
tional litigation.12 ' Rutledge played a leading role in this dramatic struggle
over redefining minimum standards to be followed in the administration of
criminal justice. He ranked with the "great liberties of speech and the press
and religious freedom" the "elemental protections thrown about the citizen
119. Ibid.
120. See Rockwell, Justice Rutledge on Civil Liberties, 59 YALE L. J. 25, 28 (1949).
121. 121 F.2d 865 (D. C. Cir. 1941), 27 IowA L. REv. 133 (1941), 14 RocKY MT. L.
REv. 69 (1941), 27 WASH. L. Q. 272 (1942).
122. The affirmative duty of the court in such circumstances to properly inform the
accused of his statutory right of appeal and other basic rights was vigorously asserted by
Rutledge. Boykin v. Huff, 121 F.2d 865, 870 (D. C. Cir. 1941).
123. 128 F.2d 265 (D. C. Cir. 1942) (Groner and Edgerton, concurred), 42 CoL. L.
REv. 1358 (1942), 30 GEO. L. J. 791 (1942), 28 IowA L. Rv. 136 (1942).
124. The plea taken at preliminary hearing by the committing magistrate was ad-
mitted in evidence at the trial "as a confession." A plea of guilty made at arraignment
and later withdrawn is inadmissible in the federal courts. Wood v. United States, 128
F.2d 265, 269 (D. C. Cir. 1942) ; Kercheval v. United States, 274 U. S. 220 (1927). The
application of the privilege against self-incrimination to a plea at either stage of the
criminal process is criticized for its unorthodoxy in Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1941-
1945, 59 HARy. L. REv. 481, 524-5 (1946) ; discussed also in Levitan, Mr. Justice Rutledge,
34 VA. L. REv. 526, 529 (1948).
Rutledge was also of the view that the accused was entitled to counsel at the pre-
liminary hearing. Wood v. United States, supra at 271. If he was without counsel "the
fairer practice . . . would advise the accused in all cases, before permitting him to speak
as a volunteer, of his right to counsel and would warn him that he need not speak and, if
he does, it is at his peril"' Id. at 277. See Fuchs, Judicial Art of Wiley Rutledge,
28 WASH. L. Q. 115, 131-3 (1943).
125. For an excellent article covering the field in full, see Green, The Bill of Rights,
The Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme Court, 46 MicH. L. REV. 868 (1948).
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charged with crime" which secure "fair play to the guilty and vindication
for the innocent.'
26
The Court's struggle over the applicable standard of review of the states'
criminal processes reached a climax in Adamson v. California.12 7 The case
concerned the validity of a California statute allowing the district attorney and
the court to comment on the defendant's failure to testify and explain or deny
the incriminating evidence introduced against him."18  The Court first con-
sidered the case in its broader aspect-a question of policy as to the basic
structure of the Constitution, whether the Fifth Amendment's proscription
that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself" constituted a specific limitation on the power of the states under the
126. Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 487-8 (1944) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
127. 332 U. S. 46 (1947).
128. Id. at 48. The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree for which
he received the death penalty. In addition, he was charged in the information with former
convictions for burglary, larceny, and robbery. He answered that he had "suffered the
previous convictions" which under California statute prevented allusions to those convic-
tions to the jury. However, in accordance with the statute's interpretations, if the de-
fendant after answering affirmatively to the charges alleging prior convictions, takes the
witness stand to deny or explain away other evidence, the commission of the prior crimes
may be revealed to the jury on cross-examination to impeach his testimony; this of
course forces the defendant to run one of two risks, having his prior offenses disclosed
to the jury or having the jury draw harmful inferences from the uncontradicted evidence
that can only be denied or explained by the defendant. Id. at 49.
On the broad policy question, the majority of the Court relied on Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908), and Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937), to hold that
the proscription against self-incrimination in the Bill of Rights was not a part of privileges
and immunities or of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and the circum-
stances of the case did not violate due process to which the defendant is entitled from
the Federal Constitution. Mr. Justice Frankfurter supported the majority opinion on
the view that since the question has once been determined and the country has once
experienced that determination, the Court should not change its interpretation. Ob-
viously as a matter of policy he also agrees with the determination. Mr. Justice Black in
his dissenting opinion stated that the Court almost uniformly bound itself by "history,"
and history as of the time of the Fourteenth Amendment showed that at least some of
its promoters were of the opinion that the Bill of Rights was to be made binding on the
states. Mr. Justice Rutledge and Mr. Justice Murphy agreed that the specific guaranties
of the Bill of Rights should be carried over intact into the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. But that was not a limitation on its interpretation. While it is
true that history adds to the understanding and may be a guide to the Court's interpreta-
tion, it is certainly not binding. In his article in 2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949), Professor
Fairman arrays much historical detail to show that history does not prove that the Bill
of Rights was to be incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment. Professor Fairman
safely does not question the fact that his historical array may not also show lack of proof
of the negative, that the Bill of Rights was not to be incorporated in the Fourteenth
Amendment. Neither does he use the result of his investigation to attack the Court's
incorporation of the First Amendment in the Fourteenth. In the judgment of many
there is little, if any, basis for Professor Morrison's "distortion charge" in Does The Four-
teenth Amendment Incorporate The Bill of Rights, 2 STAN. L. Ray. 140, 162 (1949).
There are reasons supporting the majority view which should make unnecessary embalm-
ing them with charges against the good faith and the good judgment of the Justices who
reach the opposite result. There are also good reasons in support of the dissenting view.
See Green, The Bill of Rights, The Fourteenth Amendment and The Supreme Court,
46 MIcH. L. REv. 869 (1948).
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Fourteenth Amendment.1 29 In 1908 Twining v. New Jersey130 had held that
the privilege against self-incrimination was not one of the "privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States" protected against abridgment by the
states.1"' However, the growth of the Constitution through the integration
of the Bill of Rights with the Fourteenth Amendment has moved ahead many
strides since the Twining case."32 Then, not one of the specific provisions of
the Bill of Rights was so incorporated through constitutional interpretation.
13
Since 1925, the Court has been in substantial accord that the freedoms of the
First Amendment constitute due process limitations on the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment." 4  But the integration of the "fair trial" protections
of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments continues to be most
pressing. 35
129. Id. at 49-54.
130. 211 U. S. 78 (1908) (opinion of the Court by Moody, J.; Harlan, J., dissenting).
131. By coincidence the Twining case also concerned an instruction to the jury that
they might draw an inference unfavorable to the defendant for his failure to testify to
explain or deny the evidence tending to incriminate him. The Court did not decide the
question of whether such an instruction violated the privilege against self-incrimination,
however; the question did not involve a "federal right" because "the exemption from
compulsory self-incrimination in the courts of the States is not secured by any part of
the Federal Constitution." Id. at 90-91, 114.
132. The attempted limitation of the powers of the states by the National Govern-
ment's Bill of Rights is a well known history. Congressman James Madison's original
draft of the Bill of Rights, as he introduced it in the First Congress, made the First
Amendment applicable to the states. His original proposal of the First Amendment pro-
vided that "No State shall violate the equal rights of conscience, or the freedom of the
press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases." The speech protection was added in the
House but the Senate deleted the application to the states. Warren, The New "Liberty"
Under the Fourteenth Amendnent, 39 HARV. L. REV: 430, 433-435 (1926).
The litigation history which has developed in stages is set out in full in Warren's
article. It begins in 1833 with Chief Justice Marshall's cryptic opinion in Barron v.
Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (U. S. 1833). Litigation continued over the application of the Bill
of Rights directly to the states until 1907. Warren, op. cit. supra 436. Beginning with
the Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (U. S. 1873), litigation continued as to whether
the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights constituted privileges and immunities of
the United States. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581 (1900), denying the pos-
sibility that the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments granted rights which were
"privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States." The next stage in the liti-
gation may be called the "liberty" and "property" stage, the substantive due process ap-
proach that since "liberty" included "property" it also included the Bill of Rights. See,
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923) ; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510
(1925).
133. Warren, supra note 132, at 439.
134. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 666 (1925) (Sanford, J., writing for the
Court: "For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of
the press-which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress-
are among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.") ; De Jonge v.
Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 364 (1937) ; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 243,
244 (1936) ; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 707 (1931) ; Stromberg v. California, 283
U. S. 359, 368 (1931) ; Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 280, 286 (1927) ; Whitney v. California,
274 U. S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
135. See Green, The Bill of Rights, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme
Court, 46 MicH. L. REv. 869 (1948).
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*The incorporation of these protections into the Fourteenth Amendment
has been most influenced by the opinion of Mr. Justice Cardozo in Palko v.
Connecticut."3 " His approach, which is the guiding principle followed by the
Court today, was based on an essential dichotomy; i.e., some of the first ten
amendments are completely incorporated into the Fourteenth and others not
at all. The basis for the dichotomy was not new,13' but in the Palko case it
was raised to an exalted prominence in the constitutional scheme and channeled
particularly to avoid binding the states with the criminal process protections.
In the judgment of Mr. Justice Cardozo and his Court' 3s these were not of
sufficient importance to the underlying foundations of democratic govern-
ment to override the constitutional policy of the Court to narrowly limit its
function in reviewing the validity of the states' governmental processes.13
The criminal process protections were of weaker construction than the First
Amendment freedoms: while they "may have value and importance," "they
are not of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty ;" and "to abolish
them is not to violate a principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."'4 °
The core of Cardozo's interpretation now is clear: double jeopardy at the
hands of the state, though it falls within the Fifth Amendment's specific pro-
scription, does not violate those "fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.' 4' It is also
clear that the very purpose of the "dichotomy of fundamentalism" was to
delimit the Court's power and that of the National Government over the states
with regard to double jeopardy. Again, it is clear that this was based on a
subjective judgment: the worth of the rights of an individual accused of
crime was less than First Amendment freedoms.142  Thus the Court refused
to expand the growth of criminal process protections and, at the same time,
136. 302 U. S. 319 (1937). Defendant was tried for murder in the first degree, found
guilty of murder in the second degree and sentenced to life imprisonment. Under a
statute permitting the state to appeal upon any question of law, the state appealed; the
judgment was reversed; and on re-trial defendant was convicted of murder in the first
degree and sentenced to death. Defendant contended (1) that this was double jeopardy
prohibited by the Fifth Amedment and (2) that the right against double jeopardy em-
bodied in the Fifth Amendment was protected against the states by the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court almost ignored the first contention. While it
did not decide the second contention as a holding, which was only that the statute was
constitutional, the dicta makes it doubly clear that the answer to the second contention
would have been in the negative. Green, slpra note 135, at 870-872.
137. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325 (1937) ; Frankfurter, J., concurring in
Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46; 65 (1947).
138. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325 (1937).
139. See discussion by Fraikfurter, J., dissenting, Board of Education v. Barnette,
319 U. S. 619, 646, 648-650 (1943).
140. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325 (1937).
141. Id. at 328; Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312, 316 (1926).
142. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325 (1937).
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retained a basis for giving the First Amendment freedoms precedence over
conflicting state policies."4
The records of many cases coming to the Court during the past decade
show a decided lack of appreciation of the meaning of the democratic process
in a sizeable portion of the police administration in this country. 44 The sharp
divisions in the Court over the results of these cases have resulted primarily
from differences in values-whether these constitutional protections thrown
about an individual accused of crime are necessary to the preservation of
democracy as the justices individually know and feel it, and to a greater or
less extent as we ourselves know and feel it.'4 ' Rutledge made it plain that
he regarded these elemental protections to be the absolute minima for the
democracy he knew, the democracy for which he and his country were striv-
ing." ' His was not a narrow, grudging recognition, but a broad, protective
recognition, by one filled with pride that his country, his democracy, placed
the highest premium on the dignity of the individual, even one accused of crime
against his own society. Some may call this humility, others a humaneness,
and perhaps some a softness; whatever it is-it is the best out of which
democracy is built. And democracy arises only out of its people.
Rutledge's position was one of extended enlightenment, giving the full
protection of each of the Bill of Rights' privileges and freedoms to all accused
in all courts.14 7 There was no watering down of any one of these, whether it
was the right to counsel, 148 the privilege against self-incrimination,'14 freedom
143. Ibid.
144. See, e.g., Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49 (1949) ; Malinski v. New York, 324
U. S. 401 (1945).
145. Compare, the opinion of the Court by Roberts, J., in Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S.
455, 474 (1942) with the dissenting opinion of Black, J. See also letter to New York
Times, August 2, 1942, by Benjamin V. Cohen and Erwin N. Griswold:
Most Americans-lawyers and laymen alike-before the decision in
Betts v. Brady would have thought that the right of the accused to counsel
in a serious criminal case was unquestionably a part of our own Bill of
Rights. Certainly the majority of the Supreme Court which rendered
the decision in Betts v. Brady would not wish their decision to be used
to discredit the significance of that right and the importance of its
observance.
Yet at a critical period in world history, Betts v. Brady dangerously
tilts the scales against the safeguarding of one of the most precious
rights of man. For in a free world no man should be condemned to
penal servitude for years without having the right to counsel to defend
him. The right to counsel, for the poor as well as the rich, is an in-
dispensable safeguard of freedom and justice under law.
Quoted by Douglas, J., in Bute v. Illinois, 333 U. S. 640, 671 n.1 (1945).
146. Rutledge, J., dissenting in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 47 (1949).
147. See, e.g., It re Yamashita, 327 U. S. 1, 41 (1946) (Rutledge, dissenting).
148. Rutledge upheld the right to counsel in all the cases decided by the Court during
the period.
Claim sustained; Rutledge voted with the majority: Uvegas v. Pennsylvania, 335
U. S. 437 (1948) ; Townsend v. Burke, 334 U. S. 736 (1948) ; Wade v. Mayo, 334 U. S.
672 (1948) ; Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U. S. 708 (1947) ; Rice v. Olsen, 324 U. S. 786
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from coerced confessions, 5 ' right to trial by jury,' right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures, 52 or freedom from cruel and unusual
punishment. 5 '
All these protections have been channeled into a "fair trial" concept as the
requisite of due process, a development which was inaugurated in Betts v.
Brady."4  The concept, applied to the right to counsel cases, for example,
requires a determination by the Court from the circumstances of each case
whether the accused was so prejudiced or the trial was so arbitrary or unfair
as to fall below the standards of due process of law. 5   Some of the circum-
stances considered are the age of the accused, his education and experience, the
complexities of his defense and his capacity to understand his predicament, the
seriousness of the offense involved, especially whether capital or noncapital,
and whether the court informed him of his rights and gave him assistance.,50
While this approach qualified the Palko case, the philosophy of a majority of
the Court remained the same: whether the "trial is offensive to the common
and fundamental ideas of fairness and right."'
' 7
In the confession cases the problem is principally one of determining the
degree of unfairness in the treatment of the defendant from the circumstances
surrounding the taking of the confession. In Ashcraft v. Tennessee,"' it was
the secret, continuous examination for at least thirty-six hours before the state-
ment was taken which made the taking and admitting of the confession a viola-
tion of due process. In Malinski v. New York,' it was the secret detention
for three days, wrongful delay in arraignment and the opportunity which that
affords for extortion of confessions which, in combination, were below the
requisite standards for due process."6" In Watts v. Indiana,"'0 the defendant
(1945); House v. Mayo, 324 U. S. 42 (1945); Tompkins v. Missouri, 323 U. S. 485
(1945) ; Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U. S. 471 (1945).
Claim not sustained: Gryger v. Burke, 334 U. S. 728 (1948) ; Bute v. Illinois, 333
U. S. 640 (1948) ; Gayes v. New York, 332 U. S. 145 (1947) ; Foster v. Illinois, 332 U. S.
134 (1947) ; Carter v. Illinois, 329 U. S. 173 (1946) ; Canizio v. New York, 327 U. S.
82 (1946).
149. Claim not sustained: Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46 (1947) (Black,
Douglas, Murphy and Rutledge, JJ., dissenting); Feldman v. United States, 322 U. S.
487 (1944) (Black, Douglas and Rutledge, JJ., dissenting).
150. Claim sustained: Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U. S. 62 (1949); Watts v.
Indiana, 338 U. S. 49 (1949) ; Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596 (1948) ; Malinski v. New
York, 324 U. S. 401 (1945) ; Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143 (1944).
151. See, e.g., It re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257 (1948) ; Ballard v. United States, 329 U. S.
187 (1946).
152. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 331 U. S. 145 (1947).
153. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U. S. 459 (1947).
154. 316 U. S. 455 (1942).
155. Id. at 473.
156. See, e.g., Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U. S. 471 (1945).
157. Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455, 473 (1942).
158. 322 U. S. 143 (1944).
159. 324 U. S. 401 (1945).
160. Id. at 419.
161. 338 U. S. 49 (1949).
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was arrested on a Wednesday and held without arraignment, without the aid of
counsel and without advice as to his constitutional rights until the following
Sunday; when not being interrogated he was held in solitary confinement in a
cell with no place to sit or sleep except on the floor ; and the confession taken
in such circumstances was held to be far below due process requirements.'62
Finally, in Wolf v. Colorado,6'3 the Court was presented with the question
of whether the Fourth Amendment's specific protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures constituted a limitation on the states' processes. That
is, whether the specific constitutional protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures fell on the fundamental-freedom of speech, press, religion,
establishment of religion-side of the dichotomy of the Palko case, or whether
it fell on the flimsy-double jeopardy, self-incrimination, trial by jury, cruel
and unusual punishment-side. The opinion of the Court "re-essays" that due
process conveys "neither formal nor fixed nor narrow requirements" and that
"due process is not confined within a permanent catalogue of what may at a
given time be deemed the limits or the essentials of fundamental rights." 64
With these verbal justifications out of the way for limiting the application of
criminal process protections under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court took
its first big step since 1932, when in Powell v. Alabama it held that the Sixth
Amendment's requirement to assistance of counsel was protected against state
denial.165 "The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the
police . . . is basic to a free society. It is therefore implicit in 'the concept
of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable against the States through the Due
Process Clause.""' And the specific Fourth Amendment protection of in-
dividual freedom falls on the fundamental First Amendment side of the
Palko dichotomy, and is protected against all governments.
But the victory for individual liberty is not so great as it might seem. A
rule of evidence provides severe limitations. If the state affirmatively sanc-
tions such "police incursion into privacy" the Constitution is violated and
remedies are available to make the protection effective.1 7 But if state officers
make "incursions into privacy," which are later held "unreasonable searches
and seizures," the use of the evidence so secured against the defendant is not
a violation of either the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments. The federal
practice is to hold such illegally obtained evidence inadmissible, but this, we
162. Id. at 53.
163. 338 U. S. 25 (1949).
164. Id. at 27.
165. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932).
166. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 27 (1949).
167. Id. at 28.
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are told, is a matter of judicial policy not included within the Fourth Amend-
ment's protections.
168
Rutledge, Murphy and Douglas dissented from this last qualification.169
Rutledge opened his dissent with a coda:
'Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not to reject
it merely because it comes late.' Similarly, one should not reject
a piecemeal wisdom, merely because it hobbles toward the truth with
backward glances .
7 0
And he restated his position that "all the specific guarantees of the Bill
of Rights should be carried over intact into the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment.' 17 1 He welcomed the fact that the Court, "in its slower progress
toward this goal," found the Fourth Amendment's protections to be "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty."' 72  The Amendment without a protective
sanction is "a dead letter" reduced to a "form of words." And for him the use
of the fruits of the illegal searches and seizures would be as much a violation
of the freedom indispensable for a democratic society as the search itself.
7 3
Those who know.of Rutledge's contribution to civil liberties will consider
this article but a superficial introduction. They will know too that much is
omitted; the deportation and denaturalization cases are significant. 7 4 Rut-
ledge's feelings about these were strong indeed. In Schneidernan v. United
States he wrote a concurring opinion to express what was "at the bottom
of the case."'
1 76
Immediately we are concerned with only one man .... Actually,
though indirectly, the decision affects millions. If, seventeen years
after a federal court adjudged him entitled to be a citizen, that
judgment can be nullified and he can be stripped of this most precious
right, by nothing more than reexamination upon the merits of the
very facts the judgment established, no naturalized person's citizen-
ship is or can be secureY.
77
No citizen with such a threat hanging over his head could be free.
If he belonged to 'off-color' organizations or held too radical, or,
perhaps, too reactionary views, for some segment of the judicial
palate, when his admission took place, he could not open his mouth
168. Id. at 28-33, 39.
169. Id. at 40, 41, 47.
170. Id. at 47.
171. Ibid.
172. Id. at 47, citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325 (1937).
173. Id. at 48.
174. Klapprott v. United States, 335 U. S. 601, 616 (1949) (Rutledge, concurring);
Knauer v. United States, 328 U. S. 654, 675 (1946) (Rutledge, dissenting) ; Baungartner
v. United States, 322 U. S. 665, 678 (1944) (separate opinion of Murphy, Black, Douglas
and Rutledge) ; Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118, 165 (1943) (Rutledge,
concurring).
175. 320 U. S. 118 (1943).
176. Id. at 165.
177. Id. at 165-166.
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without fear his words would be held against him. For whatever he
might say or whatever any such organization might advocate could
be hauled forth at any time to show 'continuity' of belief from the
day of his admission or 'concealment' at that time. Such a citizen
would not be admitted to liberty. His best course would be silence or
hypocrisy. This is not citizenship. Nor is it adjudication.
It may be doubted that the framers of the Constitution intended to
create two classes of citizens, one free and independent, one haltered
with a lifetime string tied to its status.17 8
Rutledge ig gone; taken in the prime of his influence as Justice, teacher,
and friend. His Faith lives on: a Faith which added its unmeasured quota
to democracy and surrounded the individual with his full share of freedom
"to make living a hopeful experience."
178. Id. at 167.
